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- Trust shift
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## Beta Testing Scenarii
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- Call from Icing dialer to another dialer (Google, Apple...)
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- Normal call from Icing dialer to another Icing dialer
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- Encrypted call from Icing dialer to another Icing dialer
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- Normal call from Icing dialer to a contact that has an Icing public key but
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not Icing dialer
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## Beta Testing Scenarios
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- Clear call from Icing dialer to another dialer (Google, Apple...)
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- Clear call from Icing dialer to another Icing dialer
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- Clear call from Icing dialer to an icing pubkey-known contact but without Icing dialer
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- Encrypted call from Icing dialer to a known contact with Icing dialer
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- Encrypted call from Icing dialer to an unknown contact with Icing dialer
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- Create / Edit / Save contact with(out) public key
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- Export contact as QR code / VCF
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- Import contact
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- Share contact as QR code / Vcard
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- Import contact from QR code / Vcard
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- Listen to voicemail
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- Record encrypted call and check the encryption
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- Change default SIM
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## User Journeys
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Karen, a 45 years-old mom just divorced from her husband. She wants to call her
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layer about who is going to have custody of the children. The husband always
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records and listens to the private conversations of her wife. To make sure he
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cannot get any information, she uses Icing dialer to call her lawyer and
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encrypt the full conversation.
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Paul, a 22 years-old developer is currently working for the U.S. Government, on
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a top secret project. He decides to go to China, for vacations but everything
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goes wrong! His application is failing in the middle of the day and no one is
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qualified to fix it. Paul doesn't have WiFi but he has an international plan
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for his phone. With Icing dialer, he can call his company and help fix the
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problem safe from potential Chinese spies.
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Mathilda, 34 years-old, connects to her PayPal account from a new device.
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To authenticate herself, PayPal sends her a code on her voicemail.
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Mathilda being aware of the risks of this technology, she has set up strong Icing authentication with her network provider by registering a pair of her Icing public keys.
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When she calls her voicemail, Icing protocol is triggered and checks for her key authentication ;
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it will fail if the caller does not pocesses the required Icing keys.
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Mathilda is thus the only one granted access, and she can retreive her PayPal code securely.
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Jeff, 70 years-old, calls his bank after he had a problem on his bank app.
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The remote bank advisor asks him to authenticate, making him type his password on the phone dialer.
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By using the Icing protocol, not only would Jeff and the bank be assured that the informations are transmitted safely,
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but also that the call is coming from Jeff's phone and not an impersonator.
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Elise is a 42 years-old extreme reporter.
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After interviewing Ukrainian opposition's leader, the SBU (ex KGB) are looking for her accross the whole country.
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She hides in western moutains near Romania, and she barely receive cellular network.
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She suspects her phone line to be monitored, so the best she can do to call for extraction safely, is to use her Icing dialer.
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Paul, a 22 years-old developer working for a big company, decides to go to China for vacations.
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But everything goes wrong! The company's product he works on, is failling in the middle of the day and no one is
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qualified to fix it. Paul doesn't have WiFi and his phone plan only covers voice calls in China.
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With Icing dialer, he can call his collegues and help fix the
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problem, safe from potential Chinese spies.
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## Evaluation Criteria
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- Can a private key be generated
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